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Rooney: Regulation of Foreign Banking Activity in the United States.

REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKING ACTIVITY IN
THE UNITED STATES
FRANCIS ROONEY*
Although recent financial developments and technological innovations have generated intense public and legislative debate over
the proper structure of domestic bank regulation,' relatively little
attention has been focused on the increasing participation of foreign
bank operatives in the United States market. This participation
raises serious questions about both the ability of our present "dual
banking system" to deal effectively with banking operations organized and primarily conducted beyond our border and the potentially disruptive consequences to international trade and comity of
state-level decision-making in this area.
The, Japanese and Canadian banks initiated the penetration of
our domestic banking markets in the 1870's,2 primarily in California, but there was little concerted foreign bank activity through the
1920's.3 Large-scale foreign bank expansion into this country is a
relatively recent phenomenon, dating no further back than the early
1960's. By 1972, however, the United States assets of foreign banks
were estimated to be $35 billion, almost 4.5% of the total domestic
banking assets, while commercial and industrial loans made in the
United States by these institutions amounted to $7 billion, or eight
percent of the total of similar loans by large domestic commercial
banks.' By 1975, within one year after these statistics had been
*

A.B., J.D., Georgetown University; Associate, Margraves, Kennerly & Schueler, Hous-

ton, Texas.
1. The President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation, known as the
"Hunt Commission," dealt comprehensively with a broad spectrum of domestic bank regulatory objectives and formulated proposals Calculated to avert future liquidity and disintermediation problems such as were encountered during the high interest periods of the late 1960's.
See THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 1
(1971). S. 2591, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) and S.1267, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) were
legislative adoptions of the Hunt Commission recommendations seeking to harmonize the
functions of differing types of financial intermediaries. To date, however, there has been no
enactment of the reform proposals. See also S.2055, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (dealing with
N.O.W. accounts); Bus. WEEK, February 27, 1978, at 76 (discussing Merrill Lynch & Co.'s
"cash management plan," a novel attempt to circumvent the Glass-Steagall Act).
2. Note, ForeignBanking in the United States, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 597 (1973).

3. See JOINT ECONOMIC

COMMITTEE, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss., FOREIGN BANKING IN THE UNITED

STATES 1 (1966).
4. HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on InternationalFinanceof the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
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explained to the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, foreign banks'
aggregate share of domestic assets reached $61.9 billion (twelve percent of total), and their commercial and industrial loan portfolio
was valued at $20 billion (16.8% of total) out of a total of $23.4
billion of loans and credits held by United States operatives of foreign banks.5 By the middle of 1978, 122 foreign banks were operating
in the United States with combined assets of $90 billion; and as of
April 1978, foreign banks held more than $26 billion in commercial
and industrial loans.' Presumably, this dramatic rate of expansion
will continue at least over the short term as multinational banking
becomes increasingly competitive. Furthermore, as entry requirements become liberalized and these banks become more adept at
competing for lucrative retail banking business, their domestic market penetration should increase. Likewise, many of the Less Developed Country (LDC) markets, which have traditionally provided
fertile avenues of expansion, have become less profitable in consequence of the higher risk presented by spiralling trade deficits and
because they have become competitively saturated.
The tremendous growth of foreign banking can be attributed to
several fundamental trends in international finance. It is axiomatic
that the volume of foreign banking tends to follow the volume of
foreign trade, along the pattern established in the early 1900's by
the large New York banks in following our nascent multinational
corporations abroad. By 1971, direct foreign investment in the
United States had reached $11.3 billion, a 200% increase from
1965.1 Although the growing proclivity of Middle Eastern petrodollar wealth to invest in the United States has received widespread publicity, there are numerous additional sources of foreign
capital which look to the United States as the most stable situs for
long term investment appreciation. Economic chaos in such countries as Canada, Jamaica, and Peru in the last five years, and the
slow growth economies of Britain, France, and Germany, contribute
significantly to the attractiveness of the United States as a long
term capital haven.'
5. Terrell & Leimone, The United States Activities of Foreign Owned Banking
Organizations, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 87, 89-90 (1975).
6. S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2827, 2828.
7. Klopstock, Foreign Banks in the United States: Scope and Growth of Operations, 55
FED. RES. BANK NEW YORK MONTHLY REv. 140, 143 (1973).
8. A detailed analysis of the source of foreign investment in the United States would be
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The massive infusion of economic assistance to Europe and Japan
after World War II and the development of a one world concept of
international interdependence, guided by various homogenizing institutions such as the United Nations, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank, have stimulated international trade and, accordingly,
generated a growing need for international banking capability. Particularly demonstrable of this need is the case of Japan with its
highly leveraged export economy and de minimis reliance on equity
financing. Likewise, the emergence of the United States dollar as
the preeminent world currency has engendered a desire on the part
of foreign banks to develop means by which dollar denominated
assets and liabilities can be acquired and used effectively in international currency arbitrage. In fact, the Eurodollar market has become a primary financing tool for international corporate development as well as a major source of banking profits?
Clearly, the question how to deal effectively with foreign bank
participation in our regulatory system merits serious consideration.
The volume of activity represented by foreign banks threatens frustration of several of the objectives toward which domestic bank
regulation is directed and, potentially, portends significant international consequences in the areas of comity and commercial reciprocity. On September 17, 1978, President Carter signed into law
the International Banking Act of 1978,10 a comprehensive effort at
adjusting the "dual banking system" to account for and rationally
deal with the presence of foreign bank operations. This article will
endeavor to examine the United States regulatory framework
far beyond the scope of this paper. Examples, however, of this trend are the purchase of real
estate by Canadian syndicates in New York City and the ownership of a significant interest
in Pennzoil Place, Houston, Texas, by a German group led by the Commerzbank of Duesseldorf, Germany. SeeBus. WEEK, April 3, 1978, at 28 (discussing Olympia and York's purchase
of eight Manhattan buildings and its plan to construct a new 1 million square foot complex);
Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1978, at 15, col. 2 (tentative agreement whereby Arlen Realty is to sell
control of its Korvettes, Inc. retail merchandising subsidiary to a French concern, the AgacheWillot Group).
9. During periods of excessively high interest rates, both domestic banks and multinational corporations have turned to the Eurodollar market for financing. See F. LEsS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE 117-26 (1974); Giddy, The Blossoming of the Eurobond Market,
10 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 66, 66-76 (1975). This trend can be dangerous. See generally
Neukomm, Risk and Error Minimization in Foreign Exchange Trading, 10 COLUM. J. WORLD

Bus. 77, 77-85 (1975) (citing the failure of the Franklin National Bank (Pennsylvania) and
I.D. Herstatt (Cologne, West Germany) as examples of over-speculation in the international
money markets).
10. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

3

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 10 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10:483

encountered by a potential foreign bank entrant and to synthesize
the principles of domestic bank regulation.
THE DOMESTIC REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Banking in the United States is carried on under a rather unusual
system of dual regulation. Two separate regulatory schemes operate
coincidently to supervise different areas of banking operations.
Moreover, a particular bank can to a large extent choose which
scheme, state or federal, it wishes to have supervise its primary
functional operations. Since creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation" and enactment of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956,12 nearly all domestic banks have become subject to
some form of direct federal regulation despite the option to have
their primary operations governed by the laws of their respective
state." This bifurcated regulatory arrangement, generally referred
to as the "dual banking system," has been alternately described as
an "accident of history"' 4 and a "great social compromise. '"' Although justifications for such a confusing and duplicative regulatory
system may appear to be largely historical, the "dual banking system" continues to thrive as an integral element of the federalist
system of government." Appendix A contains a general outline of
the jurisdictional bases from which this confusing and often overlap11. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1811-1831 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978).
12. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-1849 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978), as amended by International
Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978). Section 1842(e) was added by
amendment in 1970 which provides that every bank which is affiliated with a bank holding
company "shall become and remain an insured bank" under the terms of section 1813(h).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(e), 1813(h) (1970).
13. The only type of bank which, under current law, could escape all direct federal
regulation would be a non-insured bank that was not a bank holding company. These banks,
representing, as of December 31, 1976, only 1.9% of the total number of domestic banks and
2.6% of domestic banks assets, are virtually non-existent.
14. See Hackley, Our Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 570-71 (1966). In an effort to
abolish state banks and to herd all domestic banking into the framework established by the
National Bank Act of 1864, a ten percent tax was levied on state bank notes in 1877. Displaying a remarkable instinct for self-preservation, the state banks merely turned to deposit
banking instead of note circulation. See id. at 570-71.
15. See J. GALBRAITH, MONEY 84 (1975) (arguing that the "dual banking system" incorporates a series of compromises between the traditional "hard" money interests of the trade and
finance centers and the "soft" money advocates from capital deficient, agrarian frontier
areas). This historical approach tends to explain the continued adherence to the "dual banking system" in such recent legislation as the Bank Holding Company Act.
16. One can see the deference paid to state regulatory authority by 12 U.S.C. § 36(c),
321 (state law governs national and state member bank branching) and by 12 U.S.C. § 1846
(states can go beyond the terms of Bank Holding Company Act in prohibiting or circumscribing bank holding company activity).
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ping admixture of regulatory bodies presently operates.
In order to deal comprehensively with the numerous regulatory
complications presented by increased foreign bank activity within
the United States, it is instructive to mention the basic objectives
that the current system of domestic regulation is designed to
achieve. Essentially, there are two fundamental premises or objectives around which all bank regulatory enactments are tailored: the
necessity of instilling confidence in the banking system and the need
for an effective system of monetary control. The former objective is
essential to the sound functioning of deposit banking and the process of deposit creation by which it operates. Deposit creation is
little more than a systematized, legitimized form of pyramiding
wherein depositors' confidence in the safety of their assets becomes
the primary determinant of the actual safety of those assets. Thus
to the former premise a corollary attaches: the necessity of assuring
depositor protection and the prevention of bank failure. 7 Since most
of the principal bank legislation has been enacted in response to,
rather than in anticipation of, fiscal crisis," the resulting regulatory
framework has an ad hoc character which can be rationalized only
as an evolutionary effort to achieve the objectives of safety and
control. While both the state and federal regulations contribute to
depositor protection and bank soundness, monetary control has
been confined to the province of the Federal Reserve Board operating through its various mechanisms for stimulating or retarding
the availability of credit."
From more than one hundred years of collective governmental
wisdom directed toward fulfilling these dual premises, several guiding principles have emerged. 20 To foreign bankers, who generally
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1970) (eumerating various safety factors relied upon by the
FDIC in approving deposit insurance and by the Comptroller in granting national bank
charters).
18. See J. GALBRAITH, MONEY 116-18 (1975). Civil War inflation and financing needs
prompted enactment of the National Bank Act of 1864; the Panic of 1907 contributed to the
creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913; and the Great Depression produced the
Federal Reserve Act of 1933, the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1934, and the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933. See id. at 116-18.
19. See BOARD oF GovmwoRs, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:

PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS iii (6th ed. 1974). The Federal Reserve Board controls the supply
of credit in three ways. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (1970)(discount window); id. § 263 (open market operations); 12 C.F.R. § 204.5 (1978) (reserve requirements place on member banks). The
efficacy of reserves as a tool of control is a matter of controversy. See Robertson & Phillips,
Are Uniform Reserve Requirements Really Necessary? 91 BANKING L.J. 403, 419 (1974). See
also J. GALBRAITH, MONEY 116-18 (1975) (arguing that the F.R.B. has been unsuccessful both
at controlling monetary expansion and at averting domestic financial crisis).
20. See generally Lichtenstein, Foreign Participationin United States Banking: Regula-
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participate in all forms of financial intermediation and have relatively few limits on their permissible investments, these traditional
limitations on banking activity may seem especially inconvenient.
The first, and most widely recognized, of these principles is the
separation of investment banking from deposit-taking or retail
banking contained in the Glass-Steagall Act. 2' Although an economic distinction exists between the two activities, based on the
particular capital market in which financial intermediation is conducted, sections 20 and 20(a)(1) of the Glass-Steagall Act were
aimed chiefly at the concentration of financial power and collusion
which was perceived to have contributed greatly to over-speculation
in the 1920's and the ensuring stock market crash of October 1929.12
So strong is the belief that the combination of investment and
depository banking is an evil to be avoided that a federal statute,
authorizing foreign branches of national banks to "exercise such
further powers as may be usual in connection with the transaction
of the business of banking in the places where such foreign branch
shall transact business," expressly prohibits such a branch from
engaging "directly or indirectly, in the business of underwriting,
selling, or distributing securities. '23 Likewise, other federal regulations prohibit an American "Edge Corporation '24 that is "engaged
in banking" from participating in the underwriting business.2 5
A second notion, that depository institutions should be restricted
geographically, was accorded express legislative reaffirmation as
2
recently as 1956 in section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act,'
which provides that:
No application shall be approved under this section which will permit
any bank holding company or any subsidiary thereof to acquire...
any additional bank located outside the State in which the operations
of such bank holding company's banking subsidiaries were princitory Myths and Realities, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 879, 886-912 (1974).
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378(a)(1) (1970). See also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401
U.S. 617, 629 (1971).
22. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971); S. REP. No. 77, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1970).
24. Id. §§ 611-632 (1970), as amended by International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
25. See 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(a)(1978). "Engaged in banking" is defined as whenever a
corporation "has aggregate demand deposits and acceptance liabilities exceeding its capital
and surplus." Id. § 211.2(d).

26. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978). The geographic limitation takes root
in the deference to state law with respect to branching. See note 16 supra.
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pally conducted . . .unless the acquisition . . .is specifically authorized by . . .the State in which such bank is located. 7
Unlike most other industries serving national, or at least potential
national markets, domestic banking does not permit maintenance
of physical locations coextensive with the scope of the business
being conducted. The concept of viable, legally functioning boundaries between federated states is alien to most potential foreign bank
entrants since the developed nations from which they hail generally
have either unitary or highly centralized governments.
A third principle, which is also baffling to foreign bankers contemplating entry into the United States market is the idea that
banking should be divorced from commerce. The National Bank Act
of 1864 lent implicit recognition to this concept by limiting the nonbanking operations of national banks to "all such incidental powers
as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking." 8 This
traditional notion concerning bank regulation was reaffirmed by the
Bank Holding Company Act. Section 4 of that Act establishes a
general prohibition on the holding, by a bank holding company, of
"any voting shares" or "ownership or control" of any company
that is not a bank unless authorized by certain specific exceptions
contained therein.2" The premise upon which this restriction is
based, although perhaps odd to foreign bankers who are accustomed
to functioning in a cartelized, interrelated business climate, comports squarely with an American concept of economic freedom: that
concentration of both suppliers and users of credit in a single entity
should be prohibited per se because of the inherent potential for
unfair or discriminatory credit allocation and conflict of interest."'
The final broad regulatory concern that permeates the treatment of banks in the United States is antitrust. Nothwithstanding
whatever logical inconsistencies may appear to exist between the
principles of free competition and an industry as pervasively regulated as commercial banking, antitrust notions concerning the evils
of industry concentration and structural movements have crept into
several areas of United States bank regulation. 3' In light of the de27. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1970).
28. 12 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978).
29. See id. § 1843. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2 establishes conclusive and rebuttable presumptions
of "control."
30. See S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5519, 5520-5522; S. REP. No. 1179, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2385, 2386; S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2482, 2482-83.
31. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 605 (1974); United
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gree to which developed nations throughout the world have embraced antitrust as a practical and effective means of promoting
sound business practices, this factor should not unduly threaten a
foreign banker. Of course the foreign antitrust regimes are generally
less rigorous than that of the United States or are aimed primarily
at the market segmentation effects of industrial cartels and thus
pose little direct threat to banking institutions."
The case of Barclays Bank InternationalLtd. 33 vividly illustrates
how application of American antitrust notions to a foreign bank
entrant can engender tortured consequences. In Barclays the New
York Superintendent of Banking denied Barclays Bank's application to acquire the Long Island Trust Company (LIT), not on
grounds that Barclays' entry into the Long Island retail market
would eliminate any existing or potential competition between Barclays and LIT nor that it would materially increase concentration
in that market, but because a New York bank of Barclays' world size
would similarily be prohibited from making the acquisition. 3' The
decision illuminates a critical shortfall in the manner in which
foreign bank entry has generally been treated. A single state banking official was able, without regard for the international repercussions of his actions and in a potentially disruptive manner, to effectuate a binding decision pertaining to a foreign organization. His
decision rather flagrantly abused traditional merger analysis since
he ignored the premise that some actual or potential danger to
competition in the relevant market must be shown to exist.3 5 The
Superintendent's ruling was based simply on Barclays' aggregate
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828 (c) (West
1969 & Supp. 1978) (1966 amendments to the Bank Merger Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(1970)
(1966 amendments to Bank Holding Company Act); id. §§ 1843(c)(8), 1971-78 (1970 amendments to Bank Holding Company Act).
32. See Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, arts. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (regulating anticompetitive agreements and abuses of a dominant position in E.E.C. commerce). With respect to the industrial focus of the E.E.C. Commission, see Mok, The Cartel Policy of the
E.E.C. Commission, 6 COMMON MARK. L. REV. 67 (1968).
33. See Recommendation of the Superintendent of Banking to the Banking Board with
respect to the Application of Barclays Bank Limited and Barclays Bank International Limited pursuant to Section 142 of the Banking Law of the State of New York 1 (1972).
34. Id. at 19. See generally Lichtenstein, Foreign Participationin United States Banking: Regulatory Myths and Realities, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 879, 902-11 (1974).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360-61 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 301 (1962). In the context of international merger, see Crane Fruehauf Ltd. v.
Fruehauf Corp., [19771 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 61, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 144 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S.
37 (1966).
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size, irrespective of its position in the Long Island or greater New
York City markets.3 6 Such a basis is comparable to judging General
Motors' share of the British automobile market by its size in the
United States. The fact that a state official, under the "dual banking system," can become involved in international commercial decisions, adds insult to the injury of this tortured decision.
REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS PRIOR TO THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING

ACT

OF

1978

Until enactment of the International Banking Act of 19783 no

comprehensive scheme existed for dealing rationally, or even consistently, at either state or federal level, with domestic operations of
foreign banks.3 Nonetheless foreign banks continue to undertake
United States operations in dramatic proportions. Compared with
many areas of the world, the United States has been quite receptive
to foreign entrants. 3 ' Despite federal statutes requiring that all
directors of national banks be U.S. citizens4 ' and that a majority
of the shares in an Edge Corporation be held by domestically con-

trolled entities," there was until recently no legislation that ex-

pressly discriminated against foreign entry, per se.42 With passage
of the new international banking act, it has been left to the states

to facilitate or impede foreign competition in the domestic markets.
Although the United States has ratified bilateral Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation Treaties (FCN) with most of the devel36. See Recommendation of the Superintendent of Banking to the Banking Board with
respect to the Application of Barclays Bank Limited and Barclays Bank International Limited pursuant to Section 142 of the Banking Law of the State of New York 20 (1972).
37. Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
38. Compare Recommendation of the Superintendent of Banking to the Banking Board
with respect to the Application of Barclays Bank Limited and Barclays Bank International
Limited pursuant to Section 142 of the Banking Law of the State of New York 20 (1972) with
Statement of the Board of Lloyds Bank Limited, 60 Fed. Res. Bull. 125, 125-26 (1974). Almost
contemporaneously with Barclays, the Federal Reserve Board and California banking authorities approved the acquisition by merger of the First Western Bank and Trust Company, a
much larger organization than LIT, by Lloyds Bank Limited, an entity which is comparable
in size to Barclays.
39. See Where Can a Bank Go?, 123 THE BANKER, No. 568, at 623 (June 1973); S. REP.
No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2827,
2835; 124 CONG. REc. H2555 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1978) (discussing discrimination by foreign
sovereigns against United States banking operations within their territories); 124 CONG. Rwc.
S11611 (daily ed. Jul. 24, 1978) (United States banks in foreign countries).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
41. Id. § 619.
42. As will be discussed hereafter,. even these statutory obstacles have now been removed. See International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, §§ 2-3,92 Stat. 607 (1978).
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oped, capitalist nations,43 the United Kingdom FCN Treaty is one
of the few agreements that does not qualify or restrict the right of
each signatory to "national treatment" when banking is concerned." A typical FCN banking provision, contained in the West
Germany FCN Treaty, provides:
Each Party reserves the right to limit the extent to which aliens
may establish, acquire interests in, or carry an enterprise engaged
within its territories in communications, air or water transport, taking on administrative trusts, banking involving depository functions
. . . (but) neither Party shall deny to. . . banking companies of the
other party the right to maintain branches and agencies . . ..
Thus the United States is as vulnerable as West Germany in terms
of restricting foreign bank activity, and questions of reciprocity may
be particularly important in determining the degree to which domestic banks are allowed to compete abroad. As Barclays points
out, under the prior regulatory system there was little the federal
government could do to forestall embarassing restrictions on United
State operations and thus avert the disturbing consequences that
those restrictions invited.
Foreign Bank Entry
It has been previously mentioned that it was left to the states, by
default, to facilitate or impede foreign bank penetration of domestic
markets. Section 21(a)(2) of the Banking Act of 1933" imposes an
entry condition on "deposit banking" as follows:
It shall be unlawful...
(2) For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust,
or other similar organization to engage . . . in the business of receiving deposits . . . unless such...
(A) shall be incorporated under, and authorized to engage in such
business by, the laws of the United States or any State . . . or
(B) shall be permitted by any State ....
43. See, e.g., Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1961, United States - Belguim, 14 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954,
United States - West Germany, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty on Commerce and
Navigation, Dec. 4, 1952, United States - Finland, 4 U.S.T. 2047, T.I.A.S. No. 2861.
44. See Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, July 3, 1815, United States-United Kingdom T.S. No. 110. The need to restrict "national treatment" of foreign banking enterprises
is generally premised upon a strategic position which deposit banking holds in a country's
economy.
45. Treaty on Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States - West Germany,
art. VII, para. 2, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (1970).
47. Id.
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A potential entrant must either be chartered through incorporation
of a state or national subsidiary's or must obtain a state license for
its branch or agency operation."9 The requirement that all directors
of a nationally chartered banking institution be United States citizens" has effectively closed the national option contained in subsection (a) to foreign entrants.5" Furthermore, the affirmative nature of
the language of this section would seem to preclude state level entry
in the absence of express statutory authorization. No foreign bank
has, as of yet, attempted to challenge the validity of the silent veto.
Several states specifically prohibit foreign banking within their

borders, and others, like Texas, allow only representative offices.52

Currently, however, there are several states which, by specific language, permit a foreign bank to conduct banking operations to varying degrees within their borders: New York, California, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Alaska, Georgia, and Missouri. 53 Only New York,
Illinois, and Massachusetts, however, allow a foreign branch to conduct the types of "full scale" banking activities that would approximate the services of a separately incorporated subsidiary.5 The
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 72.
51. Id. § 378 (a)(2).
52. Texas authorizes representative offices by statute. See Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 342-901 to 951 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1978-1979). The Texas Constitution, however,
provides that "[no foreign corporation, other than the national banks of the United States,
shall be permitted to exercise banking on discounting privileges in this State." Tax. CONST.
art. 16, § 16, cl.3.
53. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 06.05.005-.545 (1978); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1750-1764 (Deering
1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 41A-3301 to 3312 (1974 & Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 1/2,
§§
101-182 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1978); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 167, §§ 37-45A (Michie/Law.
Co-op 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 362.010-.900 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1979); N.Y. BANKING LAW
§§ 200-206 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1978-1979). As an example of the various limitations
placed upon foreign banks operating in the United States, Georgia allows only foreign agencies which may not accept deposits but may maintain credit balance accounts. See GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 41A-3301 to 3312 (1974 & Supp. 1978). California allows branches in the sense that
a foreign banking corporation can accept deposits under certain circumstances, but requires
one of two things. The first is that the corporation be approved for FDIC deposit insurance.
See CAL. FIN. CODE § 1756.1 (Deering 1978). This condition is one that an unincorporated
branch cannot meet because 12 U.S.C. 99 1813-1814 require that a bank be incorporated at
either the state or federal level in order for its deposits to be insurable by the FDIC. The
second requirement is that the deposits which are to be accepted be foreign-sourced. See
CAL. FIN. CODE § 1756.2(b) (Deering 1978). This condition negates the very purpose of establishing a branch by foreclosing the opportunity to compete in the local retail deposit market.
Accordingly, foreign banks operating in California generally use the subsidiary method of
entry.
54. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 1h, §§ 101-182 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1978); MAss.
ANN. LAWS. ch. 167, 99 37-45A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1977); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 200-206
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1978-1979).
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remaining states limit the degree to which a foreign bank may conduct banking business within their borders. 5
As a consequence of the deferral of control to the states over
foreign bank entry, a foreign banking operation is subject to primary regulation of its operations at the state level. This regulation
includes control over items such as capital requirements, lending
limitations, reserves, periodic examination, and reporting obligations. Federal regulation of foreign bank operations by the Federal
Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
accrues only in the event of the separate incorporation of a United
56
States banking subsidiary.
Arguable Competitive Advantages Accruing to Foreign Banks
Many ardent advocates of regulatory reform of foreign banking
are quick to point out the competitive advantages that the United
States operations of such foreign banks supposedly have vis-a-vis
their domestic counterparts. These advantages derive from the ability of certain forms of foreign controlled operations to circumvent
the regulatory principles of separation of investment from deposit
banking activities and the geographical limitation on the physical
range of depository institutions. Since foreign banks have very little
incentive to subject themselves to the capital stock57 and reserve
requirements58 of the Federal Reserve System, and the prohibitions
on becoming affiliated with an underwriting organization" and on
maintaining a management interlock with such an operation, "' these
restrictions can be avoided easily by refraining from becoming a
member bank.
55. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 06.05.005-.545 (1978); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1750-1764 (Deering 1978); GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 41A-3301 to 3312 (1974 & Supp. 1978).
56. In the event of incorporation of a separate subsidiary, the Bank Holding Company
Act will apply because there will exist "control over any bank" by "any company" within
the purview of 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1) (1970). Since the activities will be controlled by the
Bank Holding Company Act, section 1842(e) provides that "[elvery bank that is a holding
company and every bank that is a subsidiary of such a company shall become and remain
an insured bank ....
" 12 U.S.C. § 1842(e) (1970).
57. See id. § 321.
58. See id. § 461. The principal advantages of F.R.B. membership are the availability
of the discount window and avenue for the national clearing of checks. See id. §§ 360, 342.
Since only the largest and most well-capitalized of foreign banks have undertaken United
States operations, they have little need for the former advantage. Concerning the latter, the
limited degree to which foreign entrants have entered the local deposit markets thus far has
not served to test their need for an efficient clearing mechanism. Furthermore, local clearing
houses may provide an alternative to the F.R.B.'s clearing mechanism.
59. See id. § 377.
60. Id. § 378.
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Another element in the "Glass-Steagall Wall" is section 21 (a)(1)
of the Act.6 ' This section makes it unlawful "for any person, firm,
corporation, association . . . engaged in the business of issuing,
underwriting, selling, or distributing . . .stocks, bonds . . . or

other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever
in the business of receiving deposits .
".2.."I'Since this provision
is limited to the combination of the two activities in a single entity,
a foreign bank can conduct United States securities operations by
ownership of a separately incorporated underwriting subsidiary
while simultaneously participating in the deposit banking market
through branch offices. Undoubtedly, this ability can be a significant advantage to foreign banks, who are accustomed to serving all
aspects of their clients' financial affairs and to undertaking considerable equity investments in the companies they serve. Consequently, numerous foreign bank operatives have exercised this opportunity. 3 This advantage is muted, however, by the Bank Holding Company Act, which applies to a foreign bank controlling a
United States subsidiary." Federal regulations specifically foreclose
bank holding companies from participating in or affiliating with an
entity participating in the securities business. 5 Since only New
York, Illinois, and Massachusetts allow full service branches, a foreign banking organization desirous of conducting both depository
and underwriting activities has been limited to these areas in the
conduct of retail banking.
Another ostensible competitive advantage accruing to foreign
banks is the ability to conduct multistate banking operations. A
foreign bank's branching powers are determined by the law of the
place of its incorporation. Thus neither the McFadden Act 6 nor the
various state law restrictions on multistate branching will restrict
the areas into which a foreign incorporated bank may branch. Additionally, since only branches or agencies will be involved, the multistate prohibitions contained in section 3(d) of the Bank Holding
61. Id. § 378(a)(1).

62. Id.§ 378(a)(1).
63. See Appendix B.
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1970). Section 1841(a)(6) defines "bank" as "any institution
organized under the laws of the United States, any state. . . which (1)accepts deposits...
(2)engages inthe business of making commercial loans." Section 1841(a)(1) defines a "bank
holding company" as "any company . . .which has control over any bank." 12 C.F.R. §
225.2 (1978) interprets "control."
65. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.125, .4(g)(2)(v)(c) (1978).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
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Company Act will not apply. 7
Although multistate branching may appear to give foreign bank
entrants power to conduct a broadly based competitive attack on
domestic deposit markets, several grounds exist for the argument
that large domestic banks are placed at no competitive disadvantage by this power. The Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee report on the International Banking Act of 1978
noted that the extent to which the multistate expansion privilege
prejudices domestic banking institutions is "a matter of some
earnest dispute." 8 Supporting this contention is the fact that many
domestic banking institutions have established a multistate presence under two exemptions contained in the Bank Holding Company Act. The first exemption authorizes control of non-banking
subsidiaries furnishing services to or performing services for a bank
holding company's banking subsidiaries." The second exemption
provides a general escape hatch from the prohibition on nonbanking activities for
any company the activities of which the Board after due notice and
opportunity for hearing has determined to be so closely related to
banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident
thereto . . . the Board shall consider whether its performance...
can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public . . .
that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration
70

Short of engaging in activities that would invite classification of
a subsidiary as a "bank," 7 ' a bank holding company is free to control
transnational non-banking affiliates under this "closely related"
test. " Regulation Y, interpreting this test, allows such disparate
activities as loan production, servicing, industrial banks, 4 engag67. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. The 1966 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 3, 80 Stat. 236 (1966), defined "bank"
for purposes of the Act to mean "any institution which accepts deposits" in the United
States and thus raised the spectre that foreign branches would be covered. The definition,
however, was narrowed to exclude them in 1970. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8), 1971-1978
(1970).
68. S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 119781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2827, 2834.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2)(A) (1970).
70. Id.§ 1843(c)(8).
71. Id. § 1843 (the acceptance of deposits and the making of commercial loans).
72. See id. § 378. The single state limitation of section 1842 (d) applies only to bank
holding companies or their subsidiaries.
73. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1978). But see 12 C.F.R. § 225.126 (1978) (outlining
activities not "closely related to banking"). See also 12 C.F.R. § 225.122(f) (1978).
74. Id. § 225.4(a)(2).
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ing in various leasing operations,75 and furnishing investment advice.7"
Thus domestic banks have been foreclosed only from the retail
deposit markets beyond the state of their principal operation. It is
questionable whether an exploitative advantage in this foreclosure
inures to foreign operatives. To avoid classification as a bank holding company, foreign banks must operate branches or agencies, but
in operating branches or agencies, they are not insurable by the
FDIC. Furthermore, only a limited number of states allow these
forms of entry, with Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois as the
only states to allow full service branching. Lastly, the Edge Act 77
allows multistate expansion by domestic banks for purposes of performing international trade financing, thus providing an opportunity to compete on an even keel in the primarily foreign bank market.78
Forms of Foreign Bank Operation in the United States
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion of foreign bank entry
and the supposed competitive advantages that these foreign institutions share over similarly situated domestic banks, the particular
form in which a foreign operation is to be conducted is critical in
assessing the nature of the regulation to which it becomes subjected.
The simplest form of entry, a representative office, does not invoke
the affirmative licensing requirement of the Banking Act of 1933
since it does not contemplate accepting deposits.7 Several states,
however, do require licensing of such offices, but there is no reason,
absent express state legislation, why representative offices could not
be established throughout the United States.
The antithesis of a representative office conducting de minimis
activity is a separately incorporated subsidiary engaging in the full
scale of banking services. Since separate incorporation will invite
classification of the foreign bank organization as a "bank holding
company,"" federal regulations will deny to that organization the
opportunity to control a United States securities underwriting affili75. Id. § 225.4(a)(6).

76. Id. § 225.4(a)(5).
77. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1970), as amended by International Banking Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
78. Id. § 615(b).
79. Id. § 27. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
80. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1970).
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ate,8 1 restrict expansion of the group's banking affiliates to the state
of their "principal" operations," and require that every domestic
banking affiliate become insured by the FDIC."8 Thus, foreign
banks pursuing the 'subsidiary route are treated generally as domestic bank holding companies. For foreign banks which were lawfully operating a plural state holding company prior to extension of
the Bank Holding Company Act to one-bank holding companies,"
however, the Federal Reserve Board has allowed retention of plural
state interests but has required that future expansion be limited to
the state of "principal" operations.85 One salient disadvantage to
the subsidiary option is that a separately incorporated entity must
stand on its own in meeting the capital requirements and lending
limitations imposed by the chartering state. Accordingly, the capital cost of investment in a subsidiary will be much greater than that
necessary for a branch or agency operations.
Once classification as bank holding company attaches to a foreign
banking organization, it must deal with additional regulations.
Section 1841(h) of the Bank Holding Company Act provides that
the prohibitions of section 1843 of this title shall not apply to shares
of any company organized under the laws of a foreign country that
does not *do any business within the United States, if such shares are
held or acquired by a bank holding company that is principally engaged in the banking business outside the United States."
This language has been' sufficient to avert the potentially embarrassing consequence of having the Federal Reserve Board require a
foreign bank to divest, pursuant to section 4 of the Bank Holding
Company Act, its holdings in various foreign subsidiaries that do
no United States business. Such a broad assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction would be difficult to justify under international law. "7
81. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(v)(c) (1978).
82. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1970).
83.. See id. § 1842(e).
84.. The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101(a),
84 Stat. 1760 (1970), amended section 1841(a), to include one-bank holding companies.
85. See Order Approving Action to Become a Bank Holding Company, Barclays Bank
D.C.O., London, England, 57 Fed. Res. Bull. 45, 46-7 (1971); Order Approving Acquisition
of Bank of London and South Africa, Limited, London, England, by Barclays Bank, Limited,
London, England, 56 Fed. Res. Bull. 734, 734 (1970).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(h) (1970), as amended by International Banking Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
87. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); IT v.
Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
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When a foreign bank holding company entertains an affiliation with
a corporation that, regardless of its foreign incorporation, does some
business in the United States, however, the nebulous test of section
4(c)(9) will apply. 8 This provision exempts from the general nonbanking prohibition
shares held or activities conducted by any company organized under
the laws of a foreign country the greater part of whose business is
conducted outside the United States, if the Board by regulation or
order determines that. . . the exemption would not be substantially
at variance with the purpose of this chapter and would be in the
public interest.
Since large foreign banking organizations, particularly the Japanese
banks, generally maintain equity holdings in their multinational
clients, in practice the exemption contained in this section may be
more useful in averting international complications of extraterritoriality and comity than the general exemption of section 2 of the
Bank Holding Company Act.
In Regulation Y the Federal Reserve Board has attempted to
strike a delicate balance between domestic regulatory principles
and the general commercial practices of foreign-based multinational banks. 0 The relevant provisions of this regulation explicitly
exempt the more common forms of foreign bank affiliates under an
"incidental test" which approximates the test employed in evaluating the non-banking activities of United States Edge Corporations
under Regulation K,11 and in ruling on the direct, foreign, nonbanking investments of domestic bank holding companies under the
Bank Holding Company Act.92 These provisions provide that:
(2) A foreign bank holding company may:
(i) Engage in direct activities of any kind outside the United States;
(ii) Engage in direct activities in the United States that are incidental to its activities outside the United States;
(iii) Own or control voting shares of any company that is not engaged, directly or indirectly, in any activities in the United States
except as shall be incidental to the international or foreign business
of such company;
88. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9) (1970).

89. Id.
90. See 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1978) (dealing generally with bank holding company regulation); id. § 225.4(g) (specifically concerned with foreign bank holding companies).
91. Compare id. § 225.4(g) with id. § 211.7(d). See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-631 (1970).
92. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1970); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(f) (1978).
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(iv) With the consent of the Board, own or control voting shares of
any company principally engaged in the United States in financing
or facilitating transactions in international or foreign commerce;
(v) Own or control voting shares of any company, organized under
the laws of a foreign country, that is engaged, directly or indirectly
in any activities in the United States if (a) such company is not a
subsidiary of such bank holding company, (b) more than half of such
company's consolidated assets and revenues are located and derived
outside the United States, and (c) such company does not engage,
directly or indirectly, in the business of underwriting, selling or distributing securities in the United States .... 11

The strictness with which the Board maintains the "Glass-Steagall
Wall," under subsection (v)(c) above, is evidenced by Banco Di
Roma, S.P.A." After establishing a seventy percent "source of income" test for affiliates "principally engaged . . . in financing of

facilitating transactions in international or foreign commerce," the
Board required divestiture by Banco Di Roma, upon becoming a
bank holding company, of an interest in Europartners Securities
Corporation. 5 Less than fifteen percent of Europartners' underwriting business was with United States customers, and seventy-three
percent of its gross income was derived from foreign sources, but
these percentages could not save the affiliation. Thus, even though
a foreign bank holding company may be able to continue its investment and underwriting practices throughout the world, Banco Di
Roma holds that even a miniscule degree of United States contact
in the securities business is prohibited."
Most foreign bank entrants have chosen, by incorporating under
state law, to forsake the opportunity of procuring FDIC deposit
insurance in exchange for freedom from the rigors of Federal Reserve
Board regulation and the Bank Holding Act. 7 When permitted,
entry by means of branch or agency operations has served to achieve
many foreign banking objectives without entanglement in extensive
regulatory or capital investment necessities. Although a branch may
become subject to state regulation of its primary banking operations, state mandated lending limits and capitalization requirements are a function of the home bank's capital. Neither the Glass93.
94.
95.
96.

12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2) (1978).
37 Fed. Reg. 21,012 (1972).
See Banco Di Roma S.P.A., 37 Fed. Reg. 21,012, 21,013 (1972).
See id. at 21,013 (violative of 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(v)(c) (1978)).

97. See notes 57-60 supra and accompanying text. Banks desirous of competing in the
California deposit market, however, have no such choice.
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Steagall Act, the McFadden Act, nor the Federal Reserve Board's
reserve requirements have applied to a foreign bank branch."
A foreign banking agency requires even less regulatory supervision
than a branch. Since these operatives do not accept deposits, they
are generally subject to less stringent reporting and examination
procedures than branches and are immune from lending limits, capital minimums, and reserve requirements. The prohibition against
deposit-taking by agency operations can be effectively circumvented through the use of "credit balances." These balances function essentially like deposits, representing sums held by the agency
on behalf of its home bank whether creditable to or due from the
larger entity.
Although it is questionable whether a foreign bank representative
office, in light of comity and reciprocity considerations, would be
held to be doing business for purposes of state court jurisdiction, it
seems clear that agency or branch operations would subject a foreign bank to suit by the United States." The recently enacted
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976"0' ends the possibility
that a foreign bank operative that has been nationalized by its home
government, or in which the government holds a significant equity
interest, could forstall legal proceedings against it on the basis of
sovereign immunity.'"' Even in absence of this enactment, it would
be unlikely that a United States court would feel compelled to decline to assert jurisdiction on the ground of sovereign immunity when
the action arose out of commercial banking activity."'2
Effect of Foreign Bank Activity in the United States
Foreign bank penetration of the United States banking market
has not been accomplished without a significant impact upon the
domestic economy. For the most part, foreign bank expansion has
contributed positively to the domestic economic structure by improving the trade balance, stimulating international trade, and in98. See notes 57-76 supra and accompanying text.
99. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
100. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1978).
101. See id. § 1605(a)(2).
102. See, e.g., Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen., 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965); Ocean Transp. Co. v. Government of Republic of Ivory
Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (E.D. La. 1967); American Hawaiian Ventures v. M.V.J.
Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622, 626 (D.N.J. 1966). See generally Letter from Jack B. Tate to
Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF STATE BuLL. 984, 984-85 (1952)
(asserting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity now expressed in 28 U.S.C.A. § § 1602,
1605(a)(2) (West Supp. 1978)).
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creasing competition in the retail banking area. Unfortunately,
however, the presence of such a large bulk of banking assets and
liabilities beyond the reach of the Federal Reserve Board's conttol
mechanism can precipitate a dilution in domestic monetary control.
Large, well-capitalized foreign banks have little incentive either to
join the Federal Reserve System or to enter into the correspondent
relationships through which credit policies are filtered through to
non-member banks. In fact, by stimulating sizeable international
investment flows in response to rising interest rates, foreign banks
can engender a counter-productive effect on Federal Reserve Board
credit tightening measures. The resulting surge in investment,
under favorable interest rates, can serve to stimulate monetary
growth. Accordingly, one of the primary goals of the International
Banking Act of 1978 is to integrate foreign bank operations into the
Federal Reserve's monetary police operations.0 3
Foreign banking organizations have exerted a more favorable
impact by contributing positively to the United States trade balance. The degree to which foreign deposits held by United States
affiliates of foreign banks exceed loans made by them to foreign
debtors represents a net reduction in the balance of payments deficit. Because such foreign bank operatives have a major interest in
providing a conduit for the channeling of funds from foreign depositors into the domestic lending markets serves both to maximize this
"net excess" effect and to explain why these banks are not unduly
concerned with their inability to obtain FDIC insurance and, thus,
to compete for local deposits. Additionally, the initial capital
investment made by foreign organizations in United States banking
facilities represents a net capital in-flow, and once established,
these facilities provide stimulus for the conversion of liquid foreign
dollar holdings into longer term United States investment.
The International Banking Act of 1978 represents an effort to
resolve the inconsistencies and shortcomings in the present treatment of foreign bank entrants and to establish a framework of equal
treatment for all banking institutions doing business in the United
States. 041 The generous hospitality extended to foreign operatives
under this statute testifies to congressional desire to retain and
perhaps amplify the positive attributes of increased foreign bank
activity.
103. See International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
104. See S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 11978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2827, 2828.
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Despite the explosive growth of the foreign banking operations in
this country, there have been few proposals to deal legislatively with
the regulatory vacuum in which these operations have functioned.
In 1966 Senator Javits introduced the Foreign Banking Control Act
into the 89th Congress proposing exclusive federal regulation of the
activities of foreign entrants. 105 This bill, however, as with subsequent similar proposals, 06 did little more than draw attention to
the issue. 07 The International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA) represents
a delicate political compromise which, while preserving the integrity of state licensing authorities, incorporates foreign banking affiliates into the Federal Reserve Board's system of monetary control
and assures federal supremacy with respect to questions of national
and foreign commerce.
Section 4 of the IBA extends the option of entry at either the
federal or state level to foreign bank operatives.'' Subject to the
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency a foreign bank may now
establish a "Federal branch" or "Federal agency" in any state where
it does not presently operate a state-licensed branch or agency and
in which the establishment of branch or agency operations .is not
prohibited by state law. 09 Furthermore, the act provides that present or future state branches or agencies may convert into their federal counterparts.10 Operations of a foreign bank at a federal branch
or agency are to be primarily regulated and supervised by the
Comptroller of the Currency as any national bank."' Additionally,
these federal branches and agencies are subject to the restrictions
of the McFadden Act."' Only one form of federal organization, either branch or agency, may be undertaken in any one state.'' For
105. S. 3765, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); see Lichtenstein, Foreign Participationin
United States Banking: Regulatory Myths and Realities, 15 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 879,
882-84 (1974).
106. See S. 958, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (produced language approaching a workable
political compromise between state and federal authorities under the dual banking system);
H.R. 11440, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (proposing stringent federal control).
107. There exists an underlying tension in any attempt to reorganize or alter the means
of supervising foreign banks. Any attempt at revision must be balanced between the need
for federal control over what are essentially national and international concerns, and the
political resistance by the states to encroachments upon state regulatory authority.
108. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, §4(a), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
109. Id.
110. Id. §4(f).
111. Id. §4(g)(1).
112. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
113. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, §4(e), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
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foreign banks that would rather use the subsidiary method of
entry, section 2 of the IBA permits the Comptroller of the Currency
to waive United States citizenship requirements." ' In the Comptrller's discretion up to a minority number of directors of a national
bank which is, or is to become, an affiliate or subsidiary of a foreign
bank may be non-citizens." 5
Section 3 of the IBA will allow foreign banks to enjoy the privileges of Edge Act Corporations. The requirement that all directors
of an Edge Corporation be United States citizens is dispensed
with."' Additionally, language has been added to 12 U.S.C. § 619
to allow a majority of the shares of the capital stock of any such
corporation to be held, upon the approval of the Federal Reserve
Board, by one or more foreign banks."'
In keeping with the extension of "national treatment" to foreign
bank operatives,"I' section 6 requires Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance as a precondition to the acceptance by any foreign branch, whether state or federal, of retail deposits, expressly
excluding agency "credit balances.""' 9 A "retail" deposit is a deposit
in an amount less than $100,000.120 For deposits which by their size
are considered to be "wholesale" banking, such insurance is volun12
tary. '

The cornerstone of the International Banking Act of 1978 is the
delicate structuring of permissible interstate activities outlined in
section 5. It is with respect to interstate activities that the question
of foreign banking in the United States most tangibly strikes the
emotional and financial concerns of the majority of banking inter114. Id. § 2. Citizenship requirements are found at 12 U.S.C. § 72 (1970).
115. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 2, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
116. Id. § 3(c). The citizenship requirement is found in 12 U.S.C. § 614 (1970).
117. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 3(f), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
There are additional Edge Act amendments which, although not pertaining exclusively
to foreign bank activities, deserve serious mention. The ten to one leverage ratio and the ten

percent reserve requirement for Edge Corporations is eliminated. See id. § 3. Hereafter, these
corporations are to be subject to the same reserve requirements as all Federal Reserve member
banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(1970). Although the Federal Reserve is to report annually on the
capitalization and activities of Edge Corporations, no specific leverage requirement or capital
structure is mandated. See International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, §§ 3 (g),
(h), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
118. See S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 119781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2827, 2835. The report states in pertinent part: "The committee thus believes
national treatment is the most appropriate policy to adopt with respect to foreign banks in
the United States .
I..."
Id. at 2835.
119. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 6, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
120. See id. § 6(a).
121. Id. § 6(a).
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ests. 22 Out of the numerous proposals for dealing with this area and
the "strong and sound arguments made by those on the differing
issues" which it raises, emerged a compromise that, in the words
of the Senate Committee, "equitably reconciles the interests and
concerns of Federal and State Officials, and domestic and foreign
banks." 21 3 Section 5 allows a foreign bank to establish branch or
agency offices in any state where they are permissible under state
law.' 4 This flexibility was created in order to ameloriate the earnest
fears of many state banking authorities that severe restrictions
upon foreign banks would deprive these states of the competitive
benefits that the presence of these foreign operatives provides.' '
When a branch is to be established and operated outside the foreign bank's home state, this interstate branch will be limited to the
acceptance of credit balances. 6 A foreign bank with interstate operations may elect, however, which one of the states in which it operates is to be deemed its home state, but in absence of such election,
the Federal Reserve Board will designate one.2 " Thus, the new statute, through section 5, endeavors to belay fears that multistate foreign bank operations will continue to threaten and impinge upon
their domestic counterparts while nonetheless purporting to satisfy
the needs of non-money center banking customers. As the committee report states:
The Section meets the competitive advantage problem by narrowly
focusing on the key interstate advantage enjoyed by foreign
banks-the ability to accept deposits at locations in several States
. . . by focusing on deposit-taking only, competitive equality is
achieved by not at the expense of stifling legitimate State objectives,
or limiting desirable foreign bank entry.' 8
Concerning non-banking activities of foreign bank operations, the
new Act provides that any foreign bank or any foreign company
controlling a foreign bank that maintains a branch, agency, or
122. See S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 2827, 2833.
123. Id. at 2836.
124. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 5, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
125. See S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in 119781 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2827, 2835-36 (testimony of Mr. E. Dunn, President of the Conference of
State Baking Supervisors before the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions).
126. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 5, 92 Stat. 607.
127. Id. § 5(c). Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act continues to apply,
however, prohibiting interstate subsidiary operations. Id. § 5(a)(5).
128. S. REP. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 119781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2827, 2837.
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subsidiary in a state of the United States shall be subject to the
provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act "to the same extent
that Bank Holding Companies are subject thereto, except . . for
purposes of Section 3 [of the IBA] .*'1 Accordingly, the strictures

and requirements of the Bank Holding Company Act pertaining to
non-banking activities will prohibit future entry into the United
States securities business by foreign entities that are engaged in
United States banking operations.'3 0 In what was a matter of serious
concern to numerous legislators,'" section 8(c) of the IBA grandfathers any non-banking activity that was engaged in, or applied to
be engaged in, by a foreign bank on or before July 26, 1978, which
would otherwise be prohibited under the application of section 4 of
the Bank Holding Company Act.' 32 Furthermore, shares of a company engaged in a prohibited non-banking activity acquired subsequent to the grandfather date, but prior to the date of the act's
enactment may be retained until December 31, 1985.13:1 As under the
Banking Holding Company Act, section 8(c) of the IBA empowers
the Federal Reserve Board to terminate the grandfather status of
any company if it determines that this action is necessary to prevent
"undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interest, or unsound banking practices in the United
States."

34

One additional wrinkle in the IBA concerns an amendment to the
House Bill which allows a "domestically controlled affiliate covered
in 1978" to expand, merge, or diversify so long as the foreign bank
owner does not increase its percentage ownership in the otherwise
prohibited affiliate.'35 A "domestically controlled affiliate covered in
1978" refers to any affiliate the majority of whose stock has been
owned or controlled by United States persons or companies since
July 26, 1978, and in which a foreign bank or group thereof owns less
than twenty-five percent of its voting shares.'36 Thus, for ownership
interests encompassed by this definition, the strict prohibition con129. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(a), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
130. See notes 80-87 supra and accompanying text.
131. See H. R. REp. No. 95-910, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-50 (1978); 124 CoNG. REc. H 2551,
2551-2575 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1978) (debate on H.R. 10,899 prior to passage).
132. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(c), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).

133. Id.
134. Compare International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(c), 92 Stat.
607 (1978) (termination of grandfather status) with 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970) (termination of grandfather status).
135. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(c), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
136. Id.
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tained in section 4(a)(1) of the Bank Holding Company Act against
direct or indirect ownership of "any voting shares of any company
which is not a bank"'37 will be permanently relaxed.
In accordance with the application of the Bank Holding Company
Act to all types of United States operations of foreign banks, section
8(e) of the IBA elaborates upon and slightly expands the exemption
provided by section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act from the
operation of the non-banking activity restrictions."' Henceforth,
excepting United States securities operations'39 and financial operations permitted under section 2(h) of the Bank Holding Company
Act, 4 0 exemptions shall extend to any company organized under the
laws of a foreign country that is "principally engaged in business
outside the United States."'' This language contrasts with the exemptions allowed in the Bank Holding Company Act to only those
companies that do "not do any business within the United
States."'
The International Banking Act of 1978 broadly restructures the
treatment of foreign banking operations in the United States. Although direct deposit-taking activities of foreign bank operations
are to be subject to the McFadden Act, and thus restricted to a
single state, some multistate expansion is permitted. It is doubtful,
however, that the ability to offer agency services and to accept
foreign source deposits will unfairly prejudice domestic retail bankers. Subject to the rather broad grandfather provisions, domestic
and foreign banks will henceforth compete on an even basis with
respect to non-banking activities. For'retail deposits, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance is mandatory and all foreign
branches and agencies may, at the Federal Reserve Board's discretion, be subjected to the reserve requirements and interest rate limitations applied to member banks under section 19 of the Federal
Reserve Act.' Likewise section 7 of the IBA empowers the Board
137. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1970).
138. Compare International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(c), 92 Stat.
607 (1978) with 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1970).
139. When an "exempt foreign company" chooses .to engage in or hold shares of a
company engaged in the business of underwriting, selling, or distributing securities in the
United States, it may do so "only to the extent that a bank holding company may do so."
International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(e), 92 Stat. 607 (1978). Accordingly, the securities option will be unavailable.
140. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(1970).
141. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 8(e), 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
142. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1970).
143. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, § 7, 92 Stat. 607 (1978).
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to make examinations of any branch or agency of a foreign bank, or
any commercial lending company controlled thereby, as it should
deem necessary."' In order to avoid administrative duplicity, and
to preserve the integrity of state examining authorities, this provision mandates that "the Board . . . insofar as possible, use the
reports of examinations made by the Comptroller, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the appropriate State Bank Supervisory Authority.""' These provisions, combined with the extension
to foreign banks of the option to enter into United States banking
activities at either the state or federal levels, display a cogent effort
at both preserving the integrity and autonomy of state regulatory
operations and extending the monetary control mechanisms of the
Federal Reserve Board to all bank operatives.'"
CONCLUSION

The United States has finally formulated its response to the penetration of its domestic banking markets by foreign-based financial
institutions. The ever increasing volume of foreign bank activity
within the borders of the United States has begged urgently for such
a solution." 7 As an effort to mollify the divergent and often conflicting interests concerned with the regulatory issues that it has sought
to address, the International Banking Act of 1978 provides a complicated, yet comprehensive, solution. Recognizing both the positive,
pro-competitive impact of foreign bank entry and the urgent need
to draw such entrants firmly within the grasp of the domestic regulatory framework, the IBA has endeavored to strike a balance that
will stimulate additional foreign bank expansion throughout the
internal markets, while denying to such operatives the opportunity
to engage in activities that are unavailable to similarly situated
United States banks.
144. Id. § 7(c)(1).
145. Id. § 7(c)(1).
146. As is permitted domestic banking institutions, foreign banks may continue to establish representative offices in any state whose law authorizes them. Id. § 10(a). Any such office
must register, however, with the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 10(a).
147. See Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1978, at 2, col. 2. The April 5, 1978, Wall Street Journal
article reported the tentative acquisition by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp.,
Hong Kong, of a significant equity interest in Marine Midland Banks, Inc., Buffalo, New
York. The transaction contemplates one of the largest foreign banking takeovers to date, with
the infusion by Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., a $17 billion bank of $200 million
worth of capital into Marine Midland Banks, Inc., an $11 billion bank, over the next two
years. See also Foldessy, Banking Industry in America is Facing Onslaught of New Foreign
Competition, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1978, at 4, col. 2; N.Y. Times, May 13, 1978, at 29, col. 4.
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Appendix A
The Dual Banking System

Function
Chartering (entry)
Branching
Deposit Insurance
Mergers
Loan Limitations1
Examinations
Reports (to be filed with)
Reserve requirements 2
Interest on loans (usury) 3
4
Interest on deposits

Management interlocks
Foreign branches
Issuance of securities
BHC activities, formation
Permissible investment

Nationa I
Banks
(NB)

State
Member,
Banks
(SMB)

Non-Member
Insured
Banks
(NMI)

OCC/Stat
OCC/State
OCC
OCC
OCC
OCC
OCC/FRB
FRB
State
FRB
FRB
FRB
OCC
FRB/Stat
OCC

State
FRB/State
FRB
FRB/State
State
FRB/State
FRB/State
FRB/State
State
FRB
FRB
FRB
FRB/State
FRB/State
FRB/State

State
FDIC/State
FDIC
FDIC/State
State
FDIC/State
FDIC/State
State
State
FDIC
FDIC
FDIC/State
FRB/State
State

1. An advantage for state banks, most sta tes impose less stringent loan limits
than the "10-rule" of 12 C.F.R. § 7.1100 (1978
2. Another potential advantage, many states allow interest-bearing securities
to function as reserves, contrary to the requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 204 (1978)
for FRB members, and require lower amounts of such reserves than 12 'U.S.C.
§ 461 (1970). Of course, this advantage will accrue only to NMI banks.
3. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1970) adopts the state law with respect to usury.
4. For FRB members, 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1970) and 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975), interpreted in 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1978), govern the payment of deposit interest; for NMI banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (Supp. V 1975) and 12 C.F.R.
§ 329 (1978) apply.
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Appendix B
Foreign-Controlled U.S. Securities Affiliates
of Foreign Banks Operating in the U.S.'
Securities Operation

Affiliated Bank (s)

ABD Securities Corporation

Algemene Bank Nederland,
Amsterdam; Dresdner Bank,
Frankfurt

Basle Securities Corporation

Swiss Bank Corporation

Daiwa Securities Company
America, Inc.

Daiwa Bank, Tokyo

Europartners Securities
Corporation

Banco di Roma, Rome;
Commerzbank, Frankfurt;
Credit Lyonnais, Paris

RWS Securities Services

Westdeutsche Landesbank
Gironzentrale

Sogen Swiss International
Corporation

Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank
N.V.;
Societe Generale, Paris;
Societe Generale de Banque
S.A.; Brussels

Suez American

Compagnie Financiere de Suez

Swiss American Securities, Inc.

Swiss Credit Bank

UBS-DS Corporation

Deutsche Bank, Frankfurt;
Union Bank of Switzerland

Yamaichi International
(America) Inc.

Fuji Bank of Japan; Industrial
Bank of Japan; Mitsubishi Bank

1. 10 COLUM. J. WORLD

Bus.

104, 104 (1975)
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